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Introduction and summary
The price and availability of energy has long been a
critical concern to industrialized nations. In 2002, the
industrialized nations as represented by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
were responsible for consuming 61 percent of the world’s
petroleum and 51 percent of the world’s natural gas.1
Higher prices have lead to concerns about the poten-
tial drag that energy costs might have on economic
growth since the first oil embargo of the 1970s. For
energy-intensive industries, high energy prices can be
particularly destructive. Yet the recent disruptive im-
pact of high energy prices appears to be muted as the
U.S. economy has shifted to a service base and gains
have been made in reducing the reliance on energy to
produce U.S. output. Twenty-five years ago it took
15,000 Btu (British thermal units) to produce $1
gross domestic product (GDP). By 2003, this had
fallen to 9,500 Btu, a decline of nearly 37 percent.
For much of 2004–05, a significant economic story
was the rising price of virtually all types of energy.
While crude oil prices grabbed the headlines as nom-
inal spot prices hit record highs approaching $60 a
barrel,2 less attention has been paid to the rise in natural
gas and coal prices. The spot price for natural gas has
risen from $4/MMBtu (per thousand Btu) in November
2003 to better than $6.25 by early November 2004.3 In
late October 2004, spot prices peaked at nearly $8.4
Coal prices have seen an even more dramatic run up
in the last several years. The spot price of Central
Appalachian coal has risen from roughly $28 per ton
in the first part of 2002 to a record nominal price of
$66.50 a ton by late October 2004.5
More than the rest of the U.S., the Midwest, with
its industrial legacy and seasonal weather pattern of
cold winters and hot summers, is more energy reliant
than the rest of the nation. In this article I will examine
in greater detail how the Midwest economy (Seventh
Federal Reserve District—7G) is exposed to energy
prices and how this exposure has changed over time.
In particular, I will look at two sources of change. First
I will examine systematic improvements in energy
efficiency and/or conservation. Second, I will examine
changes in the structure of the economy away from
energy-intensive industries toward services industries,
focusing on how economic structure differs from state
to state within the District and in comparison to the
U.S. as a whole. I find that the Midwest has followed
a similar path as the rest of the nation in reducing the
amount of energy input needed to produce $1 of GDP.
However, I also find that the region has, on a relative
basis, increased its national share of seven energy-in-
tensive industries, suggesting that the region will feel
the effects of rising energy prices slightly more than
the nation as a whole. In particular, the region is highly
reliant on natural gas, so volatility and price increases
in this fuel bear our particular attention.
The remainder of this article is organized as fol-
lows. The second section will provide a brief literature
review regarding the importance of energy markets
and energy prices to the macroeconomy and to state
and regional economies. The third section will brief-
ly describe the recent evolution of energy prices and
volatility that shows that volatility may be the more
difficult issue for economic performance. Energy mar-
kets have historically had a boom and bust cycle that
has discouraged both consumers and producers from
changing their behavior. The fourth section describes
the economies of the 7-G states and how their simi-
larities and/or differences from other parts of the
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country with respect to energy prices. The evidence
suggests that the region is still relatively more exposed
to energy costs than the rest of the nation as a whole.
The final section offers some concluding observations.
Related literature
Since the mid-1970s economists have been examin-
ing the effect of energy and, in particular, oil price shocks
on the macroeconomy. Early empirical studies tended
to measure the effect by regressing GDP on oil prices
and other selected variables (Rasche and Tatom, 1977a,
1977b). However isolating the effect of oil prices has
always been a difficult econometric task providing very
little in the way of “clean experiments” where oil prices
alone cause declines in economic output. Darby (1982)
makes the case that the 1973 oil price shock was the
closest to a clean experiment in as much as the world was
just emerging from the international monetary arrange-
ments established at Bretton Woods and the U.S. was
emerging from a period of generalized price controls,
reducing the confounding effect of other factors on eco-
nomic performance. In a landmark article, Hamilton
(1983) found that an oil price increase has preceded
every recession in the U.S. since World War II with the
exception of 1960. This finding focused research atten-
tion on the importance of oil in the economy throughout
the post-World War II era rather than just on the eco-
nomic effect from the two oil embargoes of the 1970s.
Other work examined the effect of price volatility
on adjustment mechanism in the economy. Gilbert and
Mork (1986) and Mork (1989) were interested in ex-
plaining the weaker-oil-price–GDP relationship that
Hamilton had found during the late 1970s by examining
whether the economy had somehow adjusted to miti-
gate the impact of oil price shocks. These studies ex-
amined whether price movements have symmetric
effects on production possibilities. They found that
any change in direction triggers resource reallocation;
however, increases in prices tend to have a more sig-
nificant effect on the economy than decreases.
More recently, oil and energy price research has
focused on its relationship to business cycle theory.
In particular research has focused on the relationship
between monetary policy adjustment and oil price
changes (Bernake, Gertler, and Watson, 1997). This
research builds on the work of Tobin (1980) that ques-
tioned whether a resource that accounts for such a small
share of U.S. GDP (oil is roughly 3 percent) could
cause large losses in GDP in ensuing recessions. These
authors suggest that it has been monetary policy adjust-
ments in response to an oil price spike that may have
played a larger role in triggering economic decline
than the oil price spike in the first place.
A recent review article (Jones, Leiby, and Paik,
2004) suggested some interesting conclusions about
what is known about the current relationship between
oil prices and GDP. Their review of the literature found
that when price movements have been large compared
with recent volatility, the effects of oil prices on the econ-
omy have been greatest. Sharp volatility is more impor-
tant because a sustained higher price causes consumers
and producers to alter their behavior in response to the
higher price. Further they suggest that the effect is mostly
seen in the reallocation of labor within specific indus-
tries. Reallocation of labor is particularly intense for
manufacturing. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) found
that the oil price shock of 1973 was related to a job re-
allocation of 11 percent of total manufacturing employ-
ment over the next 15 quarters. However, they note in
particular that this reallocation occurs within industry
classifications and even at the plant level. Sector-spe-
cific and plant-specific factors are at work, suggesting
that the real distributional effect of an energy price shock
needs to be examined at the sector or plant level.
Literature on regional adjustment to energy prices
Brown and Yucel (2004) have documented the
effect of higher oil prices on the Texas economy noting
that the region’s industries have become less energy
reliant tending to mute the impact of sudden increases
in oil prices. However, they have also noted that, as
the oil producing and refining industries have declined
in importance, the Texas economy has not received
the same boost as in the past when oil companies were
major beneficiaries of higher prices. Using a vector
autoregression (VAR) model, they found that rising
oil prices only raised Texas gross state product (GSP)
by one-fifth as much during the period 1988 to 2002
as they had during the period 1970–87.6
In another regional study, Bradbury (2005) looked
at the effect of higher energy prices on households by
census region over the winter of 2003–04 in compar-
ison to the winter of 2004–05. During this period the
U.S. Department of Energy forecasted that fuel oil
prices would increase by 39 percent, gasoline by 24 per-
cent, and natural gas by 13 percent. This study recog-
nized that the relative fuel mix used by a given region
largely determines what the effect of increased ener-
gy prices will be on the average household. From the
household’s perspective, energy consumption falls into
two broad baskets—home heating and residential needs
and transportation. Each region of the country has spe-
cific energy needs determined by weather, driving pat-
terns, and region-specific preferences for certain fuel
types. Bradbury finds that the short-run impact of high-
er energy prices will be most felt in New England21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
due largely to a preference for heating
oil. For the Midwest, reliance on natural
gas and higher than national average trans-
portation needs drives energy costs. The
projected energy cost increase as a share
of consumer spending from the winter of
2003–04 to the winter of 2004–05 is esti-
mated at 1.26 percent for New England
and 1.11 percent for the East North Cen-
tral region.7
A brief history of fuel prices
and volatility
In this section I provide an overview
of fuel price behavior and measures of
price volatility. As figure 1 demonstrates,
the price movements of the three major
energy fuels used in the U.S. have not
moved in synch.8 This should not be of
any real surprise given that each fuel is
governed by its own set of market dy-
namics. For example, oil prices reflect
supply and demand conditions in a world market.
Oil prices were clearly affected by the disruption in
supply from the Arab oil boycotts of the 1970s and
more recently by the growing world demand (partic-
ularly from China and India) and concerns over po-
tential supply disruptions. In contrast, natural gas and
coal prices reflect regional conditions and certain id-
iosyncracies specific to each fuel. In the case of natu-
ral gas, the U.S. market is highly integrated with
Canada, creating a regional North American market.9
Natural gas prices reflect the infrastruc-
ture used to deliver the product, and pric-
es are set at regional trading hubs. The
recent increase in natural gas prices re-
flects limitations in the pipeline infra-
structure to deliver the product and
growing concern that North American
gas fields are maturing leading to more
expensive extraction and lower well pro-
ductivity. In addition the relative inability
to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG)
imports by the U.S. (LNG accounts for
2 percent of U.S. energy consumption)
means that no ready substitute for North
American production exists. Finally, in
the case of coal, the market has been
shaped by continued concern over the
environmental attributes of the fuel.
While coal is still the preferred fuel for
baseload electricity generation, years of
environmental regulation and potential
concern over options such as carbon taxes has limit-
ed coal consumption. The recent increase in coal
prices reflects a renewed desire by utilities to burn
coal to offset the sharp increases in costs of alterna-
tive fuels, particularly natural gas.
Figure 2 provides a slightly different look at fuel
prices. In it, the prices for inflation have been adjust-
ed and normalized by relating the price to the price
per million Btu.10 Then, to more closely reflect U.S.
fuel consumption patterns, motor fuel is substituted
FIGURE 1
Average annual energy prices
Notes: Crude oil is measured in dollars per barrel, natural gas is measured in
dollars per million Btu, and utility coal is measured in dollars per ton.
Source: BP, 2005, Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, report, available
at www.bp.com/genericsection.do?categoryId=92&contentId=7005893.
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Real fuel prices, dollars per million Btu, 1970–2004
Sources: Author’s calculation for 2002–04; and U.S. Energy Information Agency,
2002, “State energy data,” chart, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/
_states.html, for 1970–2001.
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for oil since nearly 70 percent of U.S. oil
consumption comes in the form of motor
fuel. Perhaps most notable in this figure
is the relatively long period of time in
which all three fuels experienced flat or
declining real prices—from the mid 1980s
to the late 1990s. Not until 2000 do you
begin to see a sharp upturn in both motor
fuel and natural gas prices, a harbinger of
things to come.
Measuring volatility
It is not just price that has a major
impact on energy markets. As was noted
in the literature review, economists have
found that the relative volatility of fuel
prices has a significant effect on the re-
sponse of the economy, households, and
firms to sudden changes in energy prices.
Casual evidence would suggest that great-
er relative volatility slows the process of
adaptation since neither consumers nor
producers know whether to make funda-
mental behavioral changes in the face of
uncertain prices. For consumers, if the
price increase is seen as temporary, they
are likely to maintain their energy con-
sumption habits by reducing expendi-
tures on other items or reducing savings
rather than making significant changes
such as installing fuel-efficient applianc-
es or buying a more fuel-efficient car.
Producers fearing a boom and bust cycle
in energy prices are likely to be wary of
making investments in long-lived physi-
cal assets based on prices that may be
short-lived. Even today in the era of oil
at well above $60 a barrel, major oil com-
panies are determining their investment
decisions based on a long-run price of oil
in the high $20 a barrel range.11 Figure 3
shows the volatility of the three major
fuels measured by the annual standard
deviation. Of the three fuels, natural gas
has exhibited the largest volatility for
more than 30 years.
Sources of volatility
For all fuels, the recent increase in
volatility is most closely related to in-
creased world demand and shrinking surplus capaci-
ty. In general, the fuel system is operating at a higher
capacity, and this can make supplies tight when de-
mand increases since there is little surplus capacity. In
the U.S. oil refineries have been operating above 90
percent capacity utilization since the early 1990s
leaving little room to compensate for an unplanned
shutdown of a refinery. In addition, the increased
FIGURE 3
Annual deviation from trend
Sources: Author’s calculation; and U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2002, “State
energy data,” chart, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_states.html, for fuel prices.
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requirements for reformulated gasoline, now 30 per-
cent of the U.S. motor fuel market, further reduces
the flexibility of refineries by requiring the produc-
tion of specialty motor fuels to meet environmental
standards for specific parts of the country. In the nat-
ural gas field, it can take up to a year for significant
new gas production to come online even in the face
of higher prices. Constraints in pipeline capacity also
can limit the ability to get gas to the market even if it
is available. In the case of LNG, it can take up to ten
years to site and build a terminal due to siting restric-
tions and construction expense. Finally, there is the
general reluctance to bring new energy resources on-
line given the long time frame over which the invest-
ment must pay out. Energy assets often have useful
lives of 20 years to 30 years. The decision to invest
in a production asset is determined by the cash flow
expected from the asset based on the estimated price
of the fuel over the life of the facility. This tends to
make energy companies somewhat conservative even
when prices are high. Having seen prior booms and
busts in prices, these companies’ conservatism is un-
derstandable. Energy industry analysts believe that
market volatility slows investment by oil and gas com-
panies.12 The bottom line is that with lower reserves,
tighter production, and an inability to rapidly respond
to increased demand, price becomes the mechanism
for balancing the market in the short run.
Turning attention to Midwest
energy and the changing structure
of the 7-G economy
Much of the concern over higher energy prices
in the Midwest has to do with the region’s economic
structure. The region has long been known as the na-
tion’s manufacturing belt. Manufacturing is significantly
more energy intensive, so it bears to reason that higher
energy costs will disproportionately affect the region’s
economy.
Figure 4, panel A–F illustrates the changing
structure of the 7-G economy based on the composi-
tion of GSP for the individual states and for the District
as a whole. What is most striking is that while the share
of GSP derived from manufacturing in the District
has declined significantly since 1980, it is still well
above the U.S. average. In contrast, the District is
slightly below the U.S. average in its share of GSP
from less energy-intensive industry sectors such as
services and finance, insurance, and real estate. Per-
haps more interesting is the contrasting structure of
each state’s economy. Illinois has dramatically reduced
GSP from manufacturing from 25 percent in 1980 to
only 13 percent by 2003. The Illinois economy has
departed from many of its industrial neighbors and
now has a structure that essentially mirrors that of the
U.S. In large measure this can be attributed to the re-
structuring of the Chicago metropolitan economy
where manufacturing has declined dramatically and
been replaced by growth in business services, retail
trade, and convention and tourism. In contrast, Indiana
and Wisconsin continue to have significantly higher
shares of GSP from manufacturing. In both states, man-
ufacturing is still the largest share of GSP at 27 per-
cent and 22 percent, respectively, in 2003. Over this
period, these states have seen less systemic restructuring
by industry sector as measured by output. Indiana in
particular has maintained a heavy concentration of
durable manufacturing in sectors such as recreational
vehicles and automotive parts. Iowa and Michigan
fall somewhere in the middle. Both have had signifi-
cant declines in GSP attributed to manufacturing (Iowa
fell from 26 percent to 20 percent and Michigan from
31 percent to 21 percent) but they still have manufac-
turing shares well above the national average. Michigan
manufacturing is still highly related to the auto sector.
Another factor increasing the energy dependence
of the region is climate. Being a region characterized
by cold winters and hot summers, energy demand for
heating and cooling in the Midwest is relatively high.
One of the easiest ways to document the relatively
harsher climate of the 7-G states is through the use of
heating and cooling degree days.13 Heating degree
days calculate the daily variation in temperature at
a location below 65 degrees Fahrenheit, while cool-
ing degree days calculate the variation above 65 de-
grees. States with high heating degree totals require
significant energy for space heating and usually are
marked by high consumption of natural gas and fuel
oil. States with high cooling degree totals are usually
large consumers of electricity needed to run air con-
ditioners.14 Table 1 (p. 26) shows the average annual
heating and cooling degree totals from 1971–2000
weighted by each state’s population in the 7-G, and
for the U.S. population as a whole.
The significant variation in heating days above
the U.S. average places a special emphasis on the use
of natural gas in the region. As table 2 (p. 26) dem-
onstrates, natural gas is overwhelmingly the pre-
ferred heating fuel in the District states, and the
region’s cold winters make the Midwest more reliant
on natural gas than any other region.
When it comes to energy consumption the five
states that compose the Seventh District have differing
patterns that tend to reflect the underlying structure
of their economies. Table 2 compares energy utiliza-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total energy consumption is above
the national average for all states ex-
cept Iowa and much of this has been
attributed to the above national aver-
age concentration of energy-intensive
manufacturing industries and mid-
western climate. However, on a per
capita consumption basis, the region
appears more moderate in its con-
sumption patterns with the exception
of Indiana.
The changing role of energy related
to economic output
From an economic perspective,
an important trend has been the de-
clining role of energy as an input to
producing gross product in the U.S.
This trend has been mirrored in the
7-G, as well as played a significant
role in reducing the importance of
energy as a basic input to production.
Figure 5 displays the change in the
number of Btus needed to produce $1
of gross product. For all three fuel
types, Btu equivalents are used to al-
low for more accurate comparisons.
The declines have been dramatic with
the amount of energy needed to pro-
duce $1 of gross product dropping by
77 percent for natural gas, 76 percent
for motor fuel, and 67 percent for coal.
In the case of natural gas, 7-G states
followed this pattern for the most part
although Indiana, Michigan, and Iowa
required higher levels of usage on nat-
ural gas to produce GSP. As for coal,
it is worth noting the significantly
higher utilization of coal to produce
GSP. Indiana uses coal as a primary
fuel for 80 percent of its electricity gen-
eration and is more dependent on coal
as a fuel than the rest of the region.
Jones, Leiby, and Paik (2004)
found that the largest economic effect
of energy price spikes was demon-
strated through changes in employment
in specific industries. They suggest
that reallocation related to an energy
price shock is often determined at the
plant level making estimates of eco-
nomic impact at even the broad indus-
try level potentially misleading. In
order to test this idea, I have selected26 4Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
Annual average heating and cooling degree days in 7-G states
and U.S., weighted by population
 Annual average Annual average






Contiguous U.S. 4,524 1,215
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “State, regional, and national
monthly heating degree days,” Historical Climatography, Series No. 5-1 and “State, regional,
and national cooling degree days,” Historical Climatography, Series No. 5-2.
TABLE 1
TABLE 2
Energy consumption patterns in 7-G and U.S.
Energy consumption/ U.S.
per capita Rank Total energy consumption Primary heating fuel
Illinois 356 million Btu 22 4.4 quadrillion Btu (rank 5) Natural gas (81 percent)
Indiana 457 million Btu 13 2.8 quadrillion Btu (rank 10) Natural gas (65 percent)
Iowa 372 million Btu 19 1.1 quadrillion Btu (rank 29) Natural gas (66 percent)
Michigan 314 million Btu 36 3.1 quadrillion Btu (rank 9) Natural gas (78 percent)
Wisconsin 333 million Btu 29 1.8 quadrillion Btu (rank 19) Natural gas (66 percent)
U.S. 349 million Btu N/A 98.9 quadrillion Btu (rank 1 in world) Natural gas (61 percent)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2000, “Petroleum profiles: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin,” available at www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/states/_states.html
the seven industries (aluminum, chemicals, forest
products, glass, metal casting, petroleum, and steel)
identified by the U.S Energy Information Agency as
the most energy intensive and examine how employ-
ment has changed in these industries following oil
shocks. I will do this for the five District states and
for the U.S. as a whole. In addition, I will look at the
effect of the relative concentration of these industries
on the District states over time. Using location quo-
tients (LQ) based on employment shares, I will dem-
onstrate which states in the District have the largest
concentration of these energy-intensive industries
and how this has changed over time. This will shed
light on the question of whether the employment in
region has in a relative sense become more or less
exposed to energy dependent industries over time.
In evaluating the structure of the Seventh District
economy, there is clearly a lack of many energy-pro-
ducing industries, with the exception of coal; however
there is a reasonable concentration of employment in
energy-intensive industries. Table 3 (p. 28) shows
some basic properties of these industries and their
relative concentration in the Seventh District.
As this table demonstrates,
Indiana in particular has a con-
centration of energy-intensive
industries. In total, Indiana had
nearly $37 billion in shipments
from these industries, with total
employment of 83,000. In all,
these industries made up more
than 7 percent of GSP. Individual
industries played important roles
in specific states. The forest
products industry in Wisconsin
is responsible for almost 4
percent of that state’s GSP and
employs 71,000. In Illinois,
chemicals account for almost 2
percent of GSP and employ 58,000. However to as-
sess the impact that high energy prices might have on
these industries, it is important to examine what their
long-term growth trends have been.
Employment trend
Figure 6 (p. 28) shows total employment in these
seven industries over 3 decades. In the case of the 7-G
states employment decline was more pronounced than
the U.S. from 1972 to 1982, however employment
turned around in the early 1980s and these industries
showed job gains up until 2000. During this period,
District employment outperformed the U.S. as a whole.
This pattern is more clearly reflected in figure 7 (p. 29)
showing the annual percentage change in employment.
It is also worth noting the behavior of employment in
light of major oil shocks. The first and second oil em-
bargoes of the 1970s and the related price shocks cre-
ated significant job loss in these seven industries, more
so in the District than for the nation as a whole. In-
terestingly, the change in employment is significantly
less volatile following the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis.
Some analysts suggest that this reflects a reallocation27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of labor in these industries where produc-
tion has moved off shore. However it is
worth noting that the sharper employment
decline of these industries in the District
states beginning in 2000 may reflect that
these industries are still relatively more con-
centrated in the District than they are in the
nation as a whole, and therefore are more
likely to respond to higher energy prices.
Evaluating the relative concentration of
energy-intensive industries in the 7-G
I have decided to use location quo-
tients (LQ) to examine how the relative
concentration of these seven industries
has changed in the District based on em-
ployment. An LQ is a common measure
in economic geography that identifies the
relative significance of a phenomenon
(in this case employment in energy-inten-
sive industries) in a region or state com-
pared with a benchmark region (in this
case the U.S.). In interpreting the results
from LQs, any number above 1 indicates
an employment share in that industry that
is above the national average. For example,
the forest products industry in Wisconsin
has increased its importance to that state’s
economy. Forest products are represented
by two Standard Industrial Classifications,
(SIC), 2400 and 2600. In Wisconsin the
location quotient for employment in SIC
2400 rose from 1.16 in 1972 to 1.96 in
2002. This means that Wisconsin has nearly
double the national average of employment
in this sector. Likewise, employment rose
from 18,500 in 1972 to 32,100 in 2002.
SIC 2600 experienced even larger growth
with its LQ rising from 2.99 to 3.82. Em-
ployment rose from 43,000 to 50,000.
Chemicals in Indiana have also grown in
importance to that state’s economy. In 1972,
chemicals had employment of 26,000 and
an LQ of 1. By 2002, employment had
risen to 33,000 and the LQ to 1.46.
On an industry-specific basis, all of
the industries have seen gains in their LQ
since 1972 in the 7-G. Specifically,
■ Metal casting, 2.0 in 1972,
2.5 in 2002,
■ Steel, 1.6 in 1972, 2.1 in 2002,
■ Aluminum, 1.7 in 1972, 2.0 in 2002,
■ Glass, 0.9 in 1972, 1.11 in 2002,
FIGURE 5
Energy use intensity
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2000, “State energy data,” chart,
available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_states.html, for fuel prices; and
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Regional economic accounts,” available at
www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm.
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B. Natural gas, 100 Btu per dollar of gross state product
Btu
C. Coal, 100 Btu per dollar of gross state product
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FIGURE 6
Employment in seven energy-intensive industries
millions











Source: Data from Haver Analytics.
TABLE 3
Energy consumption patterns in 7-G and U.S.
Energy intensity
(energy purchased Industry Employment Value of
as a % of value Primary energy/ percentage in thousands shipments in
 of product fuel type used of GSP in top in top 7-G states billions of $, 2000
Industry shipped, 2001) in production 7-G states (national rank) (national rank)
Aluminum 6.9 Electricity 76% Indiana .43% Indiana 6.1 (1) Indiana $2.5 (2)
Natural gas 20% Illinois .05% Illinois 2.5 (6) Illinois $0.9 (6)
Chemicals 3.7 Natural gas 37% Indiana 4.6% Illinois 58.1 (5) Illinois $22.2 (8)
Illinois 1.8% Indiana 22.4 (10) Indiana $18 (10)
Forest Wood–4.7 Wood residues 50% Wisconsin 3.9% Wisconsin 71.3 (2) Wisconsin $18.1 (1)
products Paper–2.0
Glass 6.5 Natural gas 54% Indiana .05% Indiana 7.2 (9) Indiana $1.2 (9)
Michigan .02% Michigan 7.2 (9) Michigan 1.6 (8)
Metal casting 4.7 Natural gas 37% Wisconsin .72% Wisconsin 22 (2) Wisconsin $3.2 (2)
Indiana .56% Michigan 19.1 (3) Michigan $3.0 (3)
Michigan .50% Indiana 17.7 (4) Indiana $2.9 (4)
Illinois .17% Illinois 13.6 (5) Illinois $1.8 (5)
Petroleum 3.9 Refined products— Illinois .4% Illinois 5.6 (5) Illinois $14.6 (4)
refinery gas, coal,
coke, and other 94%
Steel 7.7 Natural gas 42% Indiana 1.75% Indiana 32.0 (2) Indiana $12 (2)
Coal 31% Michigan .39% Illinois 14.9 (4) Illinois $ 5 (4)
Illinois .27% Michigan 11.2 (5) Michigan $3.7 (5)
on the rise since hitting its trough in 1981 and has
been consistently above the nation since 1988. On
an individual state basis, the story is quite different.
Illinois and Michigan have consistently lowered their
employment LQs in these industries. Iowa while still
■ Chemicals, 0.7 in 1972, 1.3 in 2002,
■ Forest products 1.25 in 1972 to 1.4 in 2002, and
■ Petroleum 0.6 in 1972, 0.7 in 2002.
Only petroleum has a relative employment con-
centration below the U.S. average and
three industries have concentrations that
are double the U.S. average.
For the District as a whole, while the
relative concentration of energy-intensive
industries has increased over this period
total employment has declined. In 1972
the LQ for all seven industries district-
wide was 1.11 and by 2002 it was 1.24.
Employment however fell from 998,600
to 731,000 (26.9 percent). On a national
level employment in these seven indus-
tries fell from 5.580 million to 4.036 mil-
lion over the same period—a decline of
27.7 percent.
There is also significant variation by
state (see figure 8). For the entire Seventh
District, employment in these highly
energy-intensive industries was a little
better than 13 percent above the nation.
However, the LQ for the District has been29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
below the national average for employment at 98,
has shown rapid gains with its LQ doubling since
1975. The two states that have the largest concentra-
tion of employment in these energy sensitive indus-
tries are Indiana and Wisconsin. Indiana’s LQ was
double the U.S. by 2000 while Wisconsin had seen
its LQ rise to 129 from a low of 70 in 1982.
Conclusion
This article makes three basic observations about
energy markets trends and behavior.
First, the market dynamics for individual
fuel types are quite different. While oil
prices are largely set in a world market,
natural gas and coal are influenced by re-
gional dynamics. Issues of fuel security,
infrastructure for delivering the fuel, gov-
ernment regulation, and the development
of spot markets and trading centers all
have varying influences on the behavior
of each fuel. However, recently energy
prices appear to have become more close-
ly linked. Demand for all fuel types has
been on the rise, and fuel substitution has
been limited leading to similar levels of
increases in all fuels. Second, price volatili-
ty appears to influence investment deci-
sions and may discourage investment in
costly energy infrastructure. Finally, the
Midwest’s economic composition suggests
that certain industries (metal casting,
steel, and aluminum) and states (Indiana
and Wisconsin) will be more significant-
ly impacted by higher fuel prices.
Many extensions to this line of re-
search are possible. Ultimately to proper-
ly assess the impact of energy costs or
energy spikes on the region’s economy it
is necessary to identify the relative im-
portance of energy as a cost of business
to individual firms. An old maxim in eco-
nomics is that high energy prices act like
a tax on consumers. If this is true the in-
teresting questions need to focus on the
incidence (or distribution) of that tax
based on specific attributes of consumers/
industries. Further, it must be recognized
that the price paid for fuel and energy
varies depending on company-specific
purchasing agreements. Some companies
buy fuel on long-term contracts and some
at spot market prices. The impact of re-
ported higher spot market prices may be
negligible on a well-hedged fund. In addition more
research needs to be done to examine the affect of
energy prices on secondary markets for industries.
For example, the Midwest is still home to the Big Three
auto producers. Reports from Detroit blame high gas
prices for reducing demand for large sport utility
vehicles. How will this affect the regions economy?
Finally, more needs to be done to understand the im-
pact of energy as it applies to the reallocation of re-
sources globally. Manufacturers increasingly see
FIGURE 7
Percentage change in employment
in the U.S. and Seventh District
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NOTES
1U.S. Energy Information Agency (2002), excel table.
2U.S. Energy Information Agency (2005b). West Texas Intermediate
rose above $55 a barrel in August of 2004, it has since risen over
$60 in July of 2005.
3U.S. Energy Information Agency (2005a).
4Natural Gas Spot Price, Henry Hub, November 3, 2003 to Novem-
ber 5, 2004 are available at from WTRG Economics (2005).
5U.S. Energy Information Agency (2004). Percent increase reflects
the change in the price per ton for central Appalachian coal from
May 31, 2002 to October 29, 2004. The October 29 price was a
record high of $66.50 per ton.
6Specifically the study found that a 10 percent increase in oil prices
increased Texas gross state product 2.6 percent during the period
1970–87 while only increasing gross state product by 0.4 percent
in the period 1988–2002. In addition the authors found that a 10
percent increase in oil prices in the first period increased Texas
employment by 1 percent. In the 1988–2002 period a ten percent
rise in oil prices lead to a 0.4 percent decline in employment.
7These estimates are based on forecasted prices in the U.S. En-
ergy Information Agency (EIA) Short-term Energy Outlook for
November 2004. The EIA estimated that from the winter of 2004
to the winter of 2005 that the price of no. 2 heating oil would rise
by 38.7 percent, residential natural gas by 12.6 percent, propane
by 22.4 percent, residential electricity 1.6 percent, and gasoline
by 23.9 percent. For the U.S. as a whole, energy is 7.1 percent of
the CPI-U. In the case of the Midwest, energy is a slightly higher
share of the consumer market basket at 7.4 percent. Residential
fuel is responsible for 4.1 percent of the energy cost and motor
fuel for the remaining 3.3 percent. Within the residential fuel cat-
egory, 52 percent of the estimates for the 2003 fuel mix was rep-
resented by electricity, 43.3 percent by natural gas, 3.5 percent by
propane, and the remaining small shares from fuel oil and kero-
sene. The Midwest reliance on natural gas in its fuel mix is the
highest in the nation. The next closest region is the Mid-Atlantic
at 34.1 percent. Clearly changes in natural gas prices will have a
larger influence on household budgets in the Midwest. As
Bradbury points out, in the short run, there is little evidence that
the household sector reacts to higher fuel prices by dramatically
reducing consumption or switching to less expensive fuels. This
can occur in the long run if higher energy prices appeared to be
sustained. Instead the household sector is likely to either use sav-
ings to pay for higher fuel prices or reduce other types of pur-
chases in order to meet their budget. The magnitude of the
increase over the last winter is large enough to be noticed by con-
sumers but is unlikely to cause radical changes in consumer be-
havior. Of course if energy is a larger portion of any individual
household’s budget, the effect will be more pronounced.
8The prices used for coal are based on the delivered utility price
per ton and not the price for central Appalachian coal used in the
introduction. Given that coal is used almost exclusively for elec-
tricity generation, this represents a fair estimate of the cost paid
by utilities.
9North America has only 4.2 percent of the proved natural gas re-
serves in the world, it produces 21 percent of the world’s supply
and accounts for 30 percent of the world’s demand. In contrast
the Middle East has nearly 41 percent of the world’s proved sup-
ply and Europe and Eurasia has 35 percent.
10A Btu is defined as the amount of heat required to raise the tem-
perature of one pound avoirdupois of water by one degree Fahren-
heit. Normalizing the price by Btu allows a comparison of the
resources needed to create this amount of heat and can be used as
a rough proxy for the heating price of a particular fuel stock.
11Briefing by Finley (2005).
12A report by the consulting firm Accenture and Cambridge En-
ergy Research Associates issued in 2003 analyzed the impact of
market volatility on 16 energy companies and found that volatil-
ity was preventing increased investment in energy assets. (See
Accenture and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 2003.)
However economists have been more ambivalent about the im-
pact of volatility on investment. The key determining factor influ-
encing the relationship between volatility and investment include
the life of the investment, whether the investment is reversible,
the nature of competition that firms in the industry are facing,
and the relative risk aversion of firms in the industry. Given these
factors, both empirical work and theoretical work come to widely
differing conclusions about whether volatility helps or hinders in-
vestment. However, it would appear that most energy companies
do have the profile (long-lived assets that tend to be irreversible
once started in an industry known for risk aversion) that would
suggest that volatility would impede investment. For a more com-
plete discussion see, Pindyck (1988), pp. 969–985. For an inter-
esting empirical study, see Bell and Campa (1997), pp. 79–88.
13A measure of the coldness of the weather experienced, based on
the extent to which the daily mean temperature falls below a refer-
ence temperature, usually 65 degrees Fahrenheit. For example, on
a day when the mean outdoor dry-bulb temperature is 35 degrees
Fahrenheit, there would be 30 degree days experienced. A daily
mean temperature usually represents the sum of the high and low
readings divided by two. A form of degree day used to estimate
energy requirements for air conditioning or refrigeration. Typically,
cooling degree days are calculated as how much warmer the mean
temperature at a location is than 65 degrees Fahrenheit on a given
day. For example, if a location experiences a mean temperature of
75 degrees Fahrenheit on a certain day, there were 10 CDD (cooling
degree days) that day because 75 – 65 = 10.
14Diaz and Quayle (1980) found that the correlation between en-
ergy use and heating degree days was as high as .97 at the house-
hold level. Energy consumption increases as the number of heating
and cooling days increase in a highly related relationship. See
Diaz and Quayle (1980), pp. 241–246.
their competition arising off shore. Is the energy pic-
ture different for industries located in key competitor
nations? By answering these questions, we can ulti-
mately develop a far clearer understanding of the im-
pact of energy prices on regional economies.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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